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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 
78A-4-103(h). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Primary Care-Giver. In a divorce action the court below found that the appellee 
Husband ("Mr. Anderson") has been the primary care-giver for the children. The 
appellant Wife ("Ms. Allred") claims this finding was in error based on contrary 
testimony she gave at trial and based on the contents of a letter from an expert witness 
that Ms. Allred asserts provides evidence that she has been the primary care-giver. Did 
the trial court err when it found Mr. Anderson to have been the primary care giver for the 
children? A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. 
Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465,467 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
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Primary Physical Custodian. The court below designated Mr. Anderson as Primary 
Physical Custodian of the parties' children. Ms. Allred asserts various factors should 
have been given more weight and that she should be designated as Primary Physical 
Custodian. Did the trial court err when it designated Mr. Anderson as Primary Physical 
Custodian? The standard of review for the issue of primary physical custody is abuse of 
discretion. Carsten v. Carsten, 2007 UT App 174, % 2, 164 P.3d 429. 
Calculation of Support Obligation. The court below imputed income to Ms. Allred 
based on her work history, noting that she is voluntarily unemployed in order to stay at 
home to take care of her infant son. Did the trial court err when it calculated Ms. 
Allred's child support obligation? The standard of review for child support 
determinations is abuse of discretion. SeeAndrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ^ 9, 169 
P.3d754. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court's determinations were within the court's discretion 
The trial court's determinations in the Supplemental Decree of Divorce are 
consistent with the relevant legal standards and are supported by adequate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. Ms. Allred has failed to meet her burden of showing that the trial 
court abused its discretion in its determinations in any of her issues for appeal. 
A. Primary Care-Giver 
The trial court based its finding that Mr. Anderson has been the children's primary 
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care-giver on competent findings. Ms. Allred has failed to show that this finding is 
clearly erroneous and she has failed to provide any transcript record of the proceedings 
below to challenge the trial court's finding of fact. 
B. Primary Physical Custodian 
The trial court designated Mr. Anderson as primary physical custodian of the 
parties' children based on findings that refer to the specific factors deemed by the 
appellate courts as pertinent to the decision of what placement is in the best interests of 
the child. The children being found to be thriving, happy, and well-adjusted, their 
continued placement with Mr. Anderson is well supported by factors deemed by Utah 
appellate courts as residing at the critically important end of the spectrum of factors. 
C. Child Support 
The trial court's determination of Ms. Allred's child support obligation conforms 
to statutory and Utah Supreme Court case law. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in setting Ms. Allred's child support obligation. 
2. Ms. Allred has failed to marshal the evidence and to provide any transcript 
record from the proceedings below 
Ms. Allred has not marshaled the evidence, but has merely reargued the evidence 
supporting her position. While this court has discretion to decline to review the trial 
court's factual findings, Ms. Allred, in addition to failing to marshal the evidence, has 
also failed to provide this court with a transcript record of the evidence presented below. 
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When no transcript is furnished on an appeal it is presumed that the evidence given was 
sufficient to sustain the judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court was within its discretion with regard to each of Ms. Alfred's issues 
for review 
The trial court's determinations in the Supplemental Decree of Divorce are 
consistent with the relevant legal standards and are supported by adequate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The standards and the court's conformance with its obligations 
as to each issue on appeal are discussed below. 
A. The trial court's finding of fact that Mr. Anderson was the primary care-giver to the 
children is supported by findings and evidence, and Ms. Allred has failed to show it is 
clearly erroneous 
Ms. Allred's first issue for appeal states that the court below erred when it found 
that Mr. Anderson was the primary care-giver to the children. Appellant's Brief page 8. 
In her brief on appeal, Ms. Allred makes two points in support of this assertion. First, 
Ms. Allred complains that the court found Mr. Anderson to have been the primary care-
giver despite testimony she gave concerning time she spent with the children taking care 
of them, and which she claims supports her contention that she should have been found to 
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have been the primary care-giver. Appellant's Brief pp. 25-26. Ms. Allred does not claim 
there was no contrary evidence which would support the court's finding that Mr. 
Anderson was the primary care-giver. However, as will be discussed below, she does not 
mention any such evidence nor does she provide any transcript record in which to locate 
either the evidence she points up or any evidence she ignores. 
Next, Ms. Allred asserts that a letter submitted by an expert witness, clinical 
psychologist Dr. Jay Jensen, supports her claim that she was the primary care giver. Id. at 
26-27. This assertion is not accurate. What the letter states is, 
The children have already accommodated the loss of their mother in a 
primary parental role. She is the one who located away from them. While 
she possesses many strengths Jason does not, I do not recommend the 
children be disrupted from the integration and stability they have achieved 
in the present arrangement. Thus I give conditional support to Jason as the 
primary residential parent in a joint legal custody arrangement. 
Letter from Dr. Jay P. Jensen page 1. While the letter does indicate that Ms. Allred has at 
some time occupied the role of primary care-giver to the children, it clearly indicates that 
presently it is Mr. Anderson who is primary care-giver. Not only that, but the expert 
witness Ms. Allred would rely on to challenge the court's finding of primary care-giver 
expresses support, albeit "conditional," for the court's ultimate determination that Mr. 
Anderson be given primary physical custody of the children. 
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Even if Ms. Alfred's claimed testimony were taken at face value, and even if the 
expert's testimony meant what she claims it does, it still would not add up to reversible 
error. A trial court's findings of fact are accorded "great deference" and are not 
overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. Riche, 784 P.2d at 467 (citations omitted). 
Appellate courts defer to the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id. In a 
custody dispute, ??[t]he trial court is best suited to assess the factors upon which it based 
its determination, given its proximity to the parties and circumstances, and its opportunity 
to personally observe and evaluate the witnesses." Id. (citations omitted). 
The court below found that "[t]he primary care-giver for the children has been 
[Mr. Anderson]." Supplemental Findings and Conclusions, Finding of Fact 116. The 
court supported this finding by noting that "[t]he Petitioner has found the last several 
child care providers and takes the children to day care more frequently than the 
Respondent. Her work schedule and the location of her job made it difficult for her in the 
past to participate as much as the Petitioner." Id. The court also found that "[t]he children 
seem to expect the Petitioner to provide their care and they go to him when they are in 
need of attention, rather than to the Respondent." Id. at U 15. What's more, as discussed 
above, the witness, Dr. Jensen, provided written testimony not only supporting the finding 
that Mr. Anderson is currently the primary care-giver, but also stating that the current 
arrangement is stable, and recommending that the children not be removed from it. 
The trial court based its finding that Mr. Anderson has been the children's primary 
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care-giver on competent findings. Ms. Allred has failed to show that this finding is 
clearly erroneous and she has failed to provide any transcript record of the proceedings 
below to challenge the trial court's finding of fact. The trial court's finding that Mr. 
Anderson has been the children's primary care-giver should be affirmed by this court. 
B. The trial court's designation of Mr. Anderson as the children's primary physical 
custodian is consistent with the standards set by appellate courts, and is supported by 
adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law 
Ms. Allred's next four issues for appeal concern the court's determination that Mr. 
Anderson be designated as the primary physical custodian of the children. Appellant's 
Brief pages 8-9. However, Ms. Allred fails to shoulder her burden of showing that the 
trial court's determination constitutes an abuse of its discretion. As will be discussed, the 
trial court's determination is consistent with standards set by Utah appellate courts and is 
supported by adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Trial courts are given particularly broad discretion in child custody matters, and 
their determinations are not overturned so long as they are consistent with the standards 
set by appellate courts, and are supported by adequate findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988). A determination of the "best 
interests of the child" turns on factors which the trial court is best able to assess, and an 
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appellate court may not substitute its own judgment unless the action taken by the trial 
court is so unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Alexander v. Alexander, 1YI 
P.2d221, 223 (Utah 1987)(quoting Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1986)). 
Where there is evidence to support a ruling, the task of determining the best interests of 
the child in a custody dispute is for the trial judge, who has the opportunity to personally 
observe and evaluate the witnesses. Id. ff[F]indings should refer to the specific factors 
pertinent to the decision of what placement is in the best interests of the child, 'including 
the particular needs of [each] child and the ability of each parent to meet those needs.1" 
Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623, 626 (Utah 1987) (quoting Martinez v. Martinez, 728 
P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1986) (per curiam)). The factors trial courts must consider in making 
custody determinations include: 
the preference of the child; keeping siblings together; the relative strength of 
the child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians; and, in 
appropriate cases, the general interest in continuing previously determined 
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well adjusted. Other factors 
relate primarily to the prospective custodians' character or status or to their 
capacity or willingness to function as parents: moral character and emotional 
stability; duration and depth of desire for custody; ability to provide personal 
rather than surrogate care; significant impairment of ability to function as a 
parent through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other cause; reasons for 
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having relinquished custody in the past; religious compatibility with the child; 
kinship, including, in extraordinary circumstances, stepparent status; and 
financial condition. 
Deeben v. Deeben, 772 P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting Hutchinson v. 
Hutchinson, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982) (footnotes omitted)). 
Generally, it is within the trial court's discretion to determine, based on the facts 
before it and within the confines set by the appellate courts, where a particular factor falls 
within the spectrum of relative importance and to accord each factor its appropriate 
weight. Hudema v. Carpenter 1999 UT 290, f 26, 989 P.2d 491 (citing Davis v. Davis, 
749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988); Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah Ct App. 1998), 
cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1999)). The importance of the myriad of factors used in 
determining a child's best interests ranges from the possibly relevant to the critically 
important. Id. At the critically important end of the spectrum, when the child is thriving, 
happy, and well-adjusted, lies continuity of placement. Id. (Siting Davis, 749 P.2d at 
648; Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 82 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) ("[Tjrial courts must 
examine a child's need for stability, and therefore, consider prior custody arrangements, 
including the duration of those arrangements, and the potential harm to the child if the 
arrangement is changed.")). Existing arrangements in which the child has thrived should 
be disturbed only if the court finds compelling circumstances. Id. 
In the present case, the trial court made the following findings related to its 
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determination that Mr. Anderson be designated as the children's primary physical 
custodian: 
• The children expect Mr. Anderson rather than Ms. Allred to provide their care and 
they go to him rather than to her when they are in need of attention. Supplemental 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of fact f 15. 
• Both parties take the children to the family's church. Id. at f^ 18. 
Mr. Anderson has been the primary care-giver of the children. Id. at \ 16. 
The children have lived with Mr. Anderson since November 2005 and are happy, 
well adjusted, and doing well in school. Id. at 119. 
Mr. Anderson "has a strong bond with the children and has strived to do what was 
in the children's best interest at all times." Id. 
To upset the current situation "would be a mistake and could be harmful to the 
children." Id. 
These findings refer to the specific factors pertinent to the decision of what 
placement is in the best interests of the child. The children being found to be thriving, 
happy, and well-adjusted, their continued placement with Mr. Anderson is well supported 
by factors deemed by Utah appellate courts as residing at the critically important end of 
the spectrum of factors. Therefore, the existing arrangement in which the children have 
thrived should be disturbed only under compelling circumstances. The trial court found 
no such compelling circumstances and, as will be discussed next, Ms. Allred has failed to 
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provide any. 
In her brief on appeal, Ms. Allred asserts four claims that she asserts are reversible 
error related to Mr. Anderson's designation as primary physical custodian . Specifically, 
Ms. Allred asserts that: 
• "The findings did not include enough of the history of...domestic violence or abuse 
[Ms. Allred] testified to and was not added as weight in the custody 
determination." Appellant's Brief, page 27. 
• "Time [that the children lived with Mr. Anderson] should not have been given the 
final determining weight in awarding custody of [the children]." Id. at 32. 
• "[Ms. Allred] is now a stay at home mother and has not returned to full time 
employment. Because the children live with their father, who works full time, they 
are subjected to surrogate care." Id. at 36. 
The parties' two children "should live together as siblings" with Ms. Allred's other 
child which was born of her marriage to her new husband after this divorce. Id. at 
39. 
As to Ms. Allred's argument that "The findings did not include enough of the 
history of...domestic violence or abuse [Ms. Allred] testified to and was not added as 
weight in the custody determination," the court made findings acknowledging Mr. 
Anderson's 2003 arrest for domestic violence and child abuse, and a 2005 ex parte 
protective order, and the dispensation of both. While Ms. Allred prefers that the court 
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linger over details contained in her version of those events, she does not dispute that the 
findings show no allegations related to domestic violence or child abuse since 2005. 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact H^f 6-14. And 
even if the version of those events urged by Ms. Allred in her brief were taken at face 
value, they do not overcome the trial court's discretion and reliance on its findings 
discussed above supporting its determination that Mr. Anderson be designated as the 
children's primary physical custodian. Foremost among these factors is the court's finding 
that the children, who have been living with Mr. Anderson since 2005, are thriving, 
happy, and well-adjusted. 
Ms. Allred's allegation that time that the children lived with Mr. Anderson was 
"given the final determining weight in awarding custody of [the children]." Is without 
support. As discussed above, the court made findings that refer to the specific factors 
pertinent to the decision of what placement is in the best interests of the child. The court 
found the children to be thriving, happy, and well-adjusted, and their continued placement 
with Mr. Anderson is well supported by factors deemed by Utah appellate courts as 
residing at the critically important end of the spectrum of factors. There is no indication 
that the time the children lived with Mr. Anderson was given "final determining weight" 
in the court's custody determination. 
Ms. Allred's assertion that the court's designation of Mr. Anderson as primary 
physical custodian is reversible error because of her stay-at-home status ignores the 
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court's discretion in balancing factors in making custody determinations. Because 
custody determinations are so fact-sensitive, there is no required set of conditions which 
the court must consider, but the applicability and relative weight of the various factors in 
a particular case lies within its discretion. Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1989). 
Ms. Allred's claim that it was improper to leave the children residing primarily 
with Mr. Anderson on grounds that they "should live together as siblings" with Ms. 
Allred's other child bom of her marriage to her new husband after this divorce is similarly 
without merit. "While it is true that a child custody award which keeps all the children of 
the marriage united is generally preferred to one which divides them between the parents, 
that preference is not binding on the face of considerations dictating a contrary course of 
action." Hirsch v. Hirsch, 725 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1986)(citing Jorgensen v. 
Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510, 512 (Utah 1979); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 
1986)). What's more, in this case the parties' children have never lived together as 
siblings with Ms. Allred's other child. 
In support of her issues on appeal regarding the court's designation of Mr. 
Anderson as primary physical custodian, Ms. Allred essentially reargues her case below 
and fails to show that the court has abused its discretion or why her reasons that she 
should have primary physical custody of the children ought to be substituted in place of 
the trial court's judgment. The court's designation of Mr. Anderson as primary physical 
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custodian of the parties' children should be affirmed. 
C. The trial court's determination of Ms. Alfred's child support obligation conforms to 
statutory and Utah Supreme Court case law 
The trial court made findings concerning child support. Supplemental Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact fflf 25-54. The court imputed income to 
Ms. Allred based on her work history, noting that she is voluntarily unemployed in order 
to stay at home to take care of her infant son. Id. Iff 43-45. This imputation was done in 
conformance with U.C.A. 78B-12-203 (formerly 78-45-7.5). Ms. Allred asserts that 
hers is "a special situation" and asserts that "[s]he is unable to work because of her infant 
son, Wylee...whom she has in her care." Appellant's Brief p.42. However, Ms. Allred 
does not assert that any of the conditions listed in 78B-12-203 (7)(d) under which income 
may not be imputed exist in this case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
setting Ms. Allred's child support obligation and the court's determinations should be 
affirmed. 
2. This court may decline, in its discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings 
because Ms. Allred failed to marshal the evidence and provided no transcript record 
on appeal 
Parties that fail to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing court 
will decline, in its discretion, to review the trial couifs factual findings. Martinez v. 
Media-Paymaster Plus/Church, 2007 UT 42 ^ 19, 164 P.3d 384. In order to challenge a 
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trial court's findings of fact on appeal, the challenger must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings in question. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct.App.1996). 
Here Ms. Allred has not marshaled the evidence, but has merely reargued the evidence 
supporting her position. 
While this court has discretion to decline to review the trial court's factual 
findings, Ms. Allred, in addition to failing to marshal the evidence, has also failed to 
provide this court with a transcript record of the evidence presented below. When no 
transcript is furnished on an appeal it is presumed that the evidence given was sufficient 
to sustain the judgment. Goodman v. Lee, 589 P.2d 759 (Utah 1978). See also, Walker 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 26 Utah 2d 383, 490 P.2d 328 (1971)(Where appellant 
elected not to bring before appellate court any of the testimony presented to the trial 
court, appellate court stated it "must presume such findings as were made to be based 
upon competent and substantial evidence"); Bennett Leasing Co. v. Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 
72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963)(Where there was no transcript of the evidence, appellate court 
"must assume it supports the finding"). 
It is true that the findings must themselves be sufficient to provide a sound 
foundation for the judgment, and conversely, that any proper judgment can only be 
entered in accordance with the findings. Brittain v. Gorman, 42 Utah 586, 133 P. 370; 
Evans v. Shand, 74 Utah 451, 280 P. 239. As described above, the trial court's 
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determinations were all based upon sufficient findings and were all within the trial court's 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was within its discretion with regard to each of Ms. Allred's issues 
for review. The trial court's finding of fact that Mr. Anderson was the primary care-giver 
to the children is supported by findings and evidence, and Ms. Allred has failed to show it 
is clearly erroneous. The trial court's designation of Mr. Anderson as the children's 
primary physical custodian is consistent with the standards set by appellate courts, and is 
supported by adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court's 
determination of Ms. Allred's child support obligation conforms to statutory and Utah 
Supreme Court case law. Mr. Anderson asks this court to affirm the actions of the court 
below. 
DATED this J> day of September, 2008. 
DOUGLAS L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Defendant 
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